近日，新加坡国立大学李光耀公共政策学院院长马凯硕教授，与复旦大学特聘教授、上海社科院中国学研究所所长、春秋研究院研究员张维为教授在《Security Times》（《Atlantic Times》第50届慕尼黑安全会议特刊）上发表文章，阐述钓鱼岛问题及中美日三国关系。双方观点针锋相对。张维为主张：中国走和平发展的道路，现在到了日本和有关各方看清并尊重中国底线的时候；而马凯硕则认为，中国摆出强硬的新姿态，将损害长远利益。观察者网杨晗轶翻译马凯硕一文如下，以资读者参考：

中国强硬的新姿态背后传达出怎样的信息？是一个强有力的政府在宣告中国从今将表现得像一个真正的大国；还是一个弱势政府屈服于国内民族主义风潮？真相如何，外界不得而知，但我们能够推断，如果中国继续坚持强硬立场，其在亚太地区获取多少利益，便要在全球层面付出多少代价。这是中国未来不得不面对的新困境。

中国领导层宣称，中国先受到了挑衅，方才做出了强硬的回应。此言非虚。2012年4月，菲律宾向主权存在争议的斯卡伯勒礁（中国称“黄岩岛”）派遣巡洋舰的行为，无异于不智的赌博。面对挑衅，中国政府自然不能被外界视为软弱。与此类似，日本首相野田佳彦不理会中国主席胡锦涛的直接反对，公开支持对主权尚存争议的尖阁诸岛/钓鱼岛实行“国有化”，将中国逼到了不得不做出回应的位置。

虽然从某种意义上说，中国的强硬是必然的，但中国自身也不一定清楚这些回应将造成怎样的长远影响。这些强硬举措已经极大地改变了全世界和地区邻国对中国的看法。十余年来，中国不断赶超世界大国却从未引起猜忌和戒心，堪称地缘政治上的奇迹。这在很大程度上应归功于邓小平的智慧遗产，作为一名强势的领袖，邓小平当年的威望足以让中国遵循“韬光养晦、善于守拙、绝不当头”的国策；而如今邓的后继者们要说服中国大众继续保持低姿态，显然有些力不从心。

尽管民意难违，但中国领导人仍然可以在强硬手段适得其反时，选择悄然让步。我在此举三个例子：第一，正如我在《大汇合》一书中所说，中国2009年向联合国公开提出（几乎囊括整个南中国海的）九段线主张（见下图）是不智之举。在当代国际法，尤其是《联合国海洋法公约》框架下，中国无法为其九段线主张有效地进行辩护，九段线必将成为中国沉重的包袱。随着中国继续发展并成为新兴的全球大国，未来迟早有一天，中国将处于美国现在的地位，那时的中国就会发现，今天不利于己的《公约》将反过来保护自身在全球各处的利益，比如在全球各处享有通航自由等权利。

所以，中国为其九段线主张积极辩护，实际上正是搬石砸脚，损害的是自己在全球范围的长远利益。如今，中国显然不能撤销九段线主张，但它可以悄悄对相关国家私下“说明”，中国划下九段线的用意仅在于对这片海域里那些自古便属于中国的岛屿声明主权。其实，中国私下已经向部分东盟国家做出保证，中国不会将九段线内所有海域都划为领海。如果国际社会要让中国默默地在九段线做出让步，最好是不要催逼中国在九段线问题上进行公开或官方的澄清。

各国在南海的主权主张：红色线为中国，深蓝色线为越南，绿色线为印尼，浅蓝色线为菲律宾，黄色线为文莱，紫色线为马来西亚

第二，2012年7月12日在金边举行的东盟外长会议上，中国的外交举措被解读为试图分化东盟，最后中国在如此重大的会议中仅获得了柬埔寨一国的支持。这是中国的另一项不智之举，也将是中国外交史上最黯淡的一笔。

然而，中国付出的代价远不止于上面提到的短期损失。亚洲悄然出现一个强大而团结的东盟集团，本是北京方面巨大的地缘政治资产，团结的东盟不会受到外界的操控，更不会成为中国的敌人。相反，一个分裂的东盟自然为中国的对手们提供了绝佳的地缘政治机会。

美国外交官公开宣称，数个东盟国家曾私下表示，为平衡愈加强大的中国，东南亚地区欢迎美国更强有力的存在。他们所言非虚。幸好，习近平主席把中国-东盟关系放到了首要位置，这将有助于中国的长期战略。

第三，北京方面时常派遣海空军到钓鱼岛周围海域巡航，已经使日本民众对中国产生了严重的敌意。如今，已有许多日本人明显对中国的崛起表现出担忧。

中国的所作所为，实际上助长了日本首相安倍晋三鼓吹的“国家正常化”，暨日本褪去二战结束至今的和平主义外衣，发展与其国家体量相当的国防实力。许多其他国家，包括美国和韩国，都对安倍政府的新动向表示关切。但只要安倍在日本国内继续受到选民的强力支持——其中不无反华民族主义势力的作用——这些国家便难以对他形成约束。

俄罗斯、印度和日本之间越来越频繁的对话与互动，是中国周边出现的一项新动向，应当引起中国高度的重视。 一旦中国的强硬立场引发了三大邻国的共同担忧，进而促使它们开始紧密合作，中国面临的全球地缘政治环境将更加艰难。

中国一贯宣称走“和平崛起”的道路。总的来说，和平崛起仍然是中国的基本对外政策，但如果中国在海事争议上继续保持强硬立场，世界对中国的看法和态度都将发生巨大的改变，最后中国将作茧自缚，给自己创造更艰险的全球地缘政治环境。

Peaceful rise or a new Cold War?

Appeasing domestic nationalist concerns comes at a strategic price for China | By Kishore Mahbubani

Does China's new assertive stance reflect a strong muscular government demonstrating that China will now behave like a normal great power? Or does it reflect a weak government that now has to bend to strong winds of domestic nationalism? We will never know the answer to these questions. But we can work out the implications for China if it continues down this assertive road. For every gain it makes on the regional front, it could pay a heavy price on the global front. This is the new dilemma that China will have to deal with.

China's leaders have argued that they have reacted strongly because they have been provoked. This is true. The Philippines unwisely upped the ante when it deployed a naval destroyer around the disputed Scarborough Shoal in April 2012. The Chinese government could not be seen to be weak in its response. Similarly, when the Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda went ahead with the nationalization of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands on July 7, 2012, despite a direct request from President Hu Jintao not to do so, China was forced into a position of responding.

While some of these strong reactions were inevitable, it is unclear whether China worked out clearly the long-term consequences of these moves. They have dramatically changed global and regional perceptions of China. For over a decade or so, China had pulled off a geopolitical miracle by rising up the ladder of great powers without ringing any alarm bells. A large part of it was due to the wisdom China inherited from Deng Xiaoping who counselled that China should take a low profile, swallow bitter humiliation and avoid any kind of assertiveness. Deng was strong enough to pull this off. His successors clearly find it more and more difficult to persuade the Chinese population to continue heeding this wisdom.

Despite this, China's leaders can quietly pull back from some of the strong positions it has taken, as they have backfired. Let me cite three. Firstly, as I document in "The Great Convergence," it was unwise of China to deposit a map containing the nine-dash line (that covered virtually all of the South China Sea) with a UN Commission in 2009 (see map page 14). This nine-dash line will become an albatross around China's neck as it is entirely indefensible under contemporary international law, especially the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As China continues to grow and emerge as a global power, it will discover like the US that the UNCLOS will protect many of its global interests to have free and open access to seaways around the world.

So if China vigorously defends the nine-dash line, it will essentially be shooting itself in the foot as it will be undermining its own long-term global interests. Clearly China cannot withdraw the nine-dash line but it can quietly and privately "clarify" its meaning to indicate that it is only claiming some traditional rocks and islands within this area. Indeed, China has already given some ASEAN countries private assurances that it does not claim all the waters within the nine-dash line as territorial waters of China. To allow China to backtrack quietly from the nine-dash line, it may be best not to push China for a public or official clarification.

Secondly, it was unwise of China to be perceived as dividing ASEAN at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Phnom Penh on July12, 2012. It will go down in China's diplomatic history as one of its lowest points since only one out of the ten ASEAN countries supported China's point of view at this crucial meeting.

But China paid an even heavier price than this short-term diplomatic loss. A strong and cohesive ASEAN community had quietly emerged as a geopolitical asset for Beijing as it ensured that ASEAN would not be captured or manipulated against China. By contrast, a divided ASEAN naturally provided geopolitical opportunities that China's rivals could exploit.

American diplomats were right in asserting publicly that several ASEAN states had whispered to them privately that they welcomed a stronger American presence in Southeast Asia to balance a more powerful China. Fortunately, Xi Jinping has made cultivation of ASEAN a priority. That should help China.

Thirdly, Beijing's constant deployment of naval vessels and aircraft in the waters around the Senkaku and Diaoyu islands has turned Japanese public opinion strongly against China. Many Japanese are now clearly apprehensive about China's rise.

All this has helped Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's efforts to create a more "normal" Japan. He wants to drop his country's post-World War II pacifist culture and develop a defense policy and posture befitting its size. Many other countries, including the US and South Korea, are concerned by this new drift in Abe's policies. But they find it hard to restrain him as long as he enjoys strong domestic support, some of which is a result of a nationalist backlash against China.

One development that China needs to watch carefully is the growing dialogue and interaction between Russia, India, and Japan. These are the three largest neighbors China has to deal with. If they begin to cooperate closely out of a rising shared concern over China's perceived assertiveness, China may well sail into a more difficult global geopolitical environment.

China has consistently declared that it is committed to a "peaceful rise". On balance, it is clear that this remains China's policy. But if it continues with its assertiveness over maritime disputes, it could dramatically alter global perceptions and attitudes towards China and also end up creating a more difficult global geopolitical environment for China.